



# DIVAS EUROZONE VALUE

Monthly Report May 2020

Marketing material for professional investors



Hansueli Jost  
Lead Manager  
DIVAS Asset Management AG

## Market environment

14 May 2020 seems to have been the watershed moment for any non-momentum asset. Following the initial sharp market sell-off in the first two weeks of May of some 7%, sensitivities on all asset categories experienced a major turning point. On 14 May 2020 we saw a substantial intraday reversal in factors, with value reversing its morning weakness and momentum rapidly selling off in the afternoon. Every day during the following two weeks we saw the same pattern, regardless of whether markets traded up, down or flat. In the morning the value factor underperformed or started with modest outperformance and then persistently recovered or expanded into considerable outperformance over the course of the day. The machine that has a vested interest to defend the positioning of its USD3 trillion momentum products kept riding multiple intra-day assaults on the value factor, but consistently failed. The only day the momentum factor prevailed was month-end, where the window dressing of the momentum factor typically dominates. This is a pattern I last experienced in March 2009, the low of the GFC, which marked the start of the last major rotation back into value. Mid-May also seems to have coincided with the peak of the weekly

cumulative inflows into global tech equity and health care equity funds. This coincided with record cash positions, sentiment nearly as bearish as at the lows of the GFC, the European equity risk premium (ERP) reaching a new record high of some 10% (7% peak in March 2009) and the multi-year high of the Swiss franc.

Valuation distortions between the growth and the value factor mid-May had reached the most extreme levels ever, pricing in a Bund yield of minus 400 basis points versus effective -55 basis points. It is impossible to imagine, what economic scenario would ever justify this, but that's what's in the price.

In the ten years from 2008 to 2018, weekly cumulative inflows into global tech equity funds had averaged some USD5bn. Mid-May we witnessed a mind-boggling USD68bn of weekly cumulative inflows, or some 14x the preceding 10-year average. With 25c and 44c of every dollar flowing into the same six stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Netflix, Google, Apple and Microsoft) in the S&P and the Nasdaq, stocks every investor effectively **has** to own, this has become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

By late May cash levels (money market funds) had reached a new record of USD4.8 trillion, up USD1.1 trillion alone over the preceding 9 weeks. This compares to USD461bn raised in the GFC of 2008 taking the total to USD3.9 trillion at the end of January 2009. Plenty of money, therefore, to eventually return back into equities.

Economic data in China, which is some two months ahead of Europe on the road to recovery, displays a clear V-shaped recovery. In particular,

manufacturing and construction and the energy consumption that goes along with it, have come a long way. Mid-May 2020 oil demand in China was already back to 13m boe (barrels of oil equivalent), just a notch below the end 2019 level of 13.7m boe. This V-shaped recovery pattern is as well visible in the car industry (Daimler and Volkswagen generate some 45-50% of their EBITDA from China). April China Industrial Production is even up 3.9% year-on-year.

By far the biggest positive earnings surprises in Q1 were once again reported by the banking sector.

5-year forward inflation expectations, rose 7 basis points to 0.98%. The 10-year Bund yield rose 14 basis points to minus 43 basis points. The Swiss Franc, which had peaked at 1.05 mid-May, weakened 92 basis points to 1.068.

Brent crude oil skyrocketed 34% to USD37.84, as it became apparent that oil demand in China was factually back to end 2019 levels and inventories had plateaued. Nickel appreciated by 1% and iron ore spiked 19%.

May Markit Eurozone Composite PMI spiked to 30.5 from the all-time low of 13.6 reported in April, coming in comfortably ahead of expectations. The May US ISM Manufacturing PMI jumped to 43.1 versus 41.5 previously, with strong new orders and prices paid sub-indices. The May Caixin China Manufacturing PMI continued to rise to 50.7 versus 49.4 previously.

## Performance

In May, the MSCI EMU Index appreciated by 4.75%. The fund's euro



# DIVAS EUROZONE VALUE

Monthly Report May 2020

Marketing material for professional investors

I-shares rose 2.87%, underperforming the MSCI EMU Index (net dividends reinvested) by 188 basis points.

## Performance contributors

- **Saint-Gobain** outperformed the market by 12%, having delivered a robust set of results, indicating that their China construction business had, by mid-April 2020, already recovered back to prior year levels.
- **ING** outperformed the market by 11% on reporting an excellent set of results, way ahead of expectations, with an attractive net interest margin of 151 basis points.
- **Continental** outperformed the market by 10%, having delivered diligently on working capital management and displaying a strong liquidity position of EUR2.5bn in cash and equivalents and EUR4.3bn in unused credit lines.
- **UniCredit** outperformed the market by 4%, having reported a very healthy CET1 ratio of 13.44% and an exceptionally high MDA buffer of 436 basis points.

## Performance detractors

- Despite iron ore prices rising 19% and the company reporting results ahead of expectations, **ArcelorMittal** underperformed the market by 18% on announcing a USD2bn rights issue. Not that they would have needed that capital, with available liquidity of USD10bn, but they wanted to avoid S&P, the ratings agency, following Moody's in downgrading their debt to junk. This move served its purpose with S&P the following day reiterating its BBB-rating. With the stock up 80% from its mid-March lows, this news triggered some profit taking.

- **Telecom Italia** reported net debt in line with expectations on strong working capital efficiencies and lower taxes, maintained its FCF guidance for 2021/22 and announced exclusive negotiations with Ardian Consortium for the sale of a significant minority stake in TIM TowerHoldCo (remaining 33.2% Inwit stake) for some EUR1.5bn, However, the stock underperformed the market by 12%, as it reported domestic mobile service revenues of -2.3%, which was somewhat below market expectations.
- Even though **Royal Dutch Shell** reported results in line with expectations and the oil price spiked 34%, the stock underperformed the market by 11% on profit taking, following the 80% appreciation from its March lows.

## Positioning

In May, the fund switched Deutsche Bank, having outperformed BNP Paribas over the last 6 months by 85%, into BNP Paribas and Saint-Gobain into AB InBev. Furthermore, it reduced its position in AXA and Covestro in order to increase its holdings in ABN AMRO Bank, Société Générale, and Banco BPM.

## Outlook

In late May, the European Commission proposed a Recovery Plan of EUR750bn, including EUR500bn of grants and EUR250bn of loans, to be disbursed over 2021-24, as part of the 2021-2027 EU budget. With regards to the loan-based mechanisms for investment, this is even somewhat more generous than the Franco-German proposal. Regarding the country allocation, it looks to be skewed

towards Southern and Eastern Europe. This proposal is likely to have its first formal discussion in the Eurogroup on 11 June 2020, possibly followed by further discussions at the EU summit 18-19 June. However, to get the program approved, it needs to be ratified by the 27 national parliaments.

In mid-May, most Eurozone banks made new all-time lows or retested their 16 March 2020 lows, trading 25%-65% below the trough of the GFC. To put this into context, Eurozone banks guided for an average cost of risk (CoR or loan loss provisions) for 2020 of 90 basis points in their Q1 results. This compares to peak 2009 credit losses of 140 basis points of loans. Excess capital over MDA (amount banks can return to shareholders in form of dividends or share buy-backs), plus 2020 pre-provision profits, average some 500 basis points of loans. This would allow the banks to cover 3-4 times the level of CoR experienced back in 2009. Put another way, even if you assumed double the guided credit losses were to occur, banks would still enjoy 320 basis points of MDA buffer, which they could use to return to shareholders. In view of the government-initiated back-up loan guarantee schemes, to the tune of EUR520bn for Germany, EUR400bn for Italy, EUR300bn for France and EUR120bn for Spain, such a scenario is anyway highly unlikely.

In May 2020, Research Affiliates published a very timely and highly up-to-date (to March 2020) empirical analysis as to whether value was dead. Even though the study was conducted on US equities, the conclusions are likely to be even more salient to Eurozone stocks, since Europe has



# DIVAS EUROZONE VALUE

**Monthly Report May 2020**

Marketing material for professional investors

nothing comparable to the six key performance drivers of growth seen in the US. The analysis basically splits the July 1963 to March 2020 period into two episodes. One from 1963 to 2007, a period the value factor delivered an average annual outperformance over growth of 6.1% and the last 13 years from 2007 to 2020 over which the value factor suffered an average annual underperformance, over growth, of 5.4%. The narrative that growth stocks post-2007 were both more profitable and had faster sales growth than pre-2007 were both disproved. ROE declined from 17% pre-2007 to 16% post-2007, while sales growth actually tumbled from 14% pre-2007 to 8% post-2007. However, what is even more remarkable is that the net delta of the change in ROE and sales growth of growth versus value (post-2007 versus pre-2007) yielded an annual net 1% benefit in favor of value, i.e. had valuations had any relevance over the last 13 years, value should have outperformed growth. The reason value

has suffered a 50% drawdown over the last 13 years is fully explained by the collapse of relative valuations, i.e. value moved from the 23<sup>rd</sup> percentile (expensive) versus growth to the 100<sup>th</sup> percentile (cheapest-ever). A modest move to the historical 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, halfway between the cheapest-ever and the median valuation for value relative to growth, would imply a 53% relative performance for value over growth.

With the pattern change seen prevailing since 14 May 2020, value should soon start to display momentum characteristics and the machine will as unemotionally and frantically start buying value as it had sold value over the course of the preceding 14 years. Food for thought!

NAV: EUR 72.39

ISIN I shares: LU1975716835

Valor I shares: 47229643



# DIVAS EUROZONE VALUE

**Monthly Report May 2020**  
Marketing material for professional investors

**Currency Risk** – Non-Base Currency Share Class: Non-based currency share classes may or may not be hedged to the base currency of the Fund. Changes in exchange rates will have an impact on the value of shares in the Fund which are not denominated in the base currency. Where hedging strategies are employed, they may not be fully effective.

**Equity:** Investments in equities may be subject to significant fluctuations in value.

**Capital at risk:** All financial investments involve an element of risk. Therefore, the value of the investment and the income thereof will vary and the initial investment amount cannot be guaranteed.

## Important legal information

This material is communicated by DIVAS Asset Management AG. This material is only to be communicated to institutional investors, investment professionals or market counterparties (e.g. banks). It has been solely prepared for informational purposes and does not constitute or form part of, and should not be construed as, an offer, invitation or inducement to purchase or subscribe for any securities or services. No part of this material, nor the fact of its distribution, should form the basis of, or be relied on in connection with, any contract or commitment of investment decision whatsoever. The information contained herein is preliminary, limited in nature and subject to completion and amendment. No representations or warranty, either express or implied, is given or made by any person in relation to the fairness, accuracy, completeness or reliability of the information or any opinions contained herein and no reliance whatsoever should be placed on such information or opinions.

There is no guarantee of trading performance and past performance is not necessarily a guide to future results. In particular the results and graphs above may contain hypothetical performance results. Hypothetical performance results are based on various assumptions and may have many inherent limitations, some of which are described below. No representation is being made that any account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown; in fact, there are frequently sharp differences between hypothetical performance results and the actual results subsequently achieved by any particular trading program. One of the limitations of hypothetical performance results is that they are generally prepared with the benefit of hindsight. In addition, hypothetical trading does not involve financial risk, and no hypothetical trading record can completely account for the impact of financial risk of actual trading. For example, the ability to withstand losses or to adhere to a particular trading program in spite of trading losses are material points which can also adversely affect actual trading results. There are numerous other factors related to the markets in general or to the implementation of any specific trading program which cannot be fully accounted for in the preparation of hypothetical performance results and all of which can adversely affect trading results. Hypothetical performance results are shown for illustrative purposes only and are not to be relied upon for making investment decisions. Clients must base their decisions on their own understanding of the strategy, the service or product and market views.

DIVAS Asset Management AG may act as a hedging advisor. Any hedging activities carry substantial risks. Hedging can involve short-selling of asset classes with unlimited downside risks in certain cases. Prospective clients hedging their portfolio might miss significant upside in the assets they hedge. Furthermore, there is always a bias between the assets being hedged, and the results of the hedging strategy (it is not possible to obtain a continuous hedge with a fix correlation of -1 over time). This bias typically increases in situation of market dislocations, as the assets being hedged are typically less liquid than the instruments used for the purpose of hedging these, and the losses of the assets being hedged become higher than the gains of the hedging strategy on the back of an increase in the liquidity premium.

This material is confidential and intended solely for the information of the person to whom it has been delivered and may not be distributed in any jurisdiction where such distribution would constitute a violation of applicable law or regulations. DIVAS Asset Management AG specifically prohibits the redistribution, reproduction or transmittal in whole or in part, to third parties.

If you are a US citizen or resident, or represent a trust which is subject to taxation under US Internal Revenue Service requirements, or represent a partnership or corporation organized under the laws of the United States of America or any state, territory or possession thereof ("US Persons") you are prohibited by law from buying investments other than those authorized for sale by the SEC. This document shall not be distributed to restricted Persons.

This material is prepared by DIVAS Asset Management AG, or an affiliate thereof, for informational purposes. No representation or warranty is made that any indicative performance or return indicated will be achieved in the future. This material has been prepared by DIVAS Asset Management AG, none of the management company, the registrar and transfer agent, the central administration or the custodian of the Fund has independently verified any information contained herein and no party makes any representation or warranty as to the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of such information.

DIVAS Asset Management AG, 2020

Divas Asset Management UG (haftungsbeschränkt), represented by Mr. Hans Ulrich Jost ("Agent") is a tied agent within the meaning of Article 29 (3) of Directive 2014/65/EU ("MiFID II") as implemented in the respective national jurisdictions, of ACOLIN Europe AG ("ACOLIN") and registered in the Tied Agent Registry of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). The Agent is entitled to engage exclusively in the reception and transmission of orders within the meaning of Annex I A (1) MiFID II in relation to one or more financial instruments. The Agent acts only on behalf and for the account of ACOLIN. The financial services performed by the Agent are exclusively in relation to the Evolt Dynamic Beta Fund and the DIVAS Eurozone Value Fund, sub-funds to the White Fleet IV Fund.

The information contained therein is intended only for informational purposes and does not constitute an offer for the purchase or sale of financial instruments. All information is provided without guarantee and is subject to change. The information contained herein does further not constitute Investment, legal, tax or any other form of advice. No investment decision should be made without obtaining qualified financial advice. This email is intended exclusively for professional clients within the meaning of Annex II MiFID II.

The information provided in this email may not be copied or forwarded without the express consent of ACOLIN. The information may not be made available to US citizens or persons residing in the USA.

This email may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information. If you are not the correct addressee, or you have received this email in error, please inform the sender immediately and delete this email.

DIVAS Asset Management UG, 2020